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Recent Developments

Post v. Bregman:

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held in Post v.
Bregman, 349 Md. 142,707 A.2d
806 (1998), that the Maryland
Lawyers' Rules of Professional
Conduct establish public policy
which should be given the force
law.
Due
to
this
of
characterization, Rule 1.5(e),
which deals with the splitting of
fees among attorneys who are
not part of the same firm, is not
strictly limited to the disciplinary
proceedings provided by the
Rules and may be enforced in
private agreements between
attorneys. Agreements entered
into in clear violation of the Rule,
therefore, can be rendered
unenforceable.
In 1988, Stanley Taylor
("Taylor") approached Douglas
Bregman ("Bregman") about
representing him in a workers'
compensation claim. Bregman
informed Taylor that he did not
handle such matters and referred
him to Alan F. Post ("Post").
Taylor then retained Post to
handle the compensation case as
well as a subsequent tort claim.
With Taylor's consent, Post
retained the firm of Connerton,
Ray, & Simon ("Connerton") to
assist with the case.
Connerton
eventually
withdrew from the case and Post
retained the firm of Paulson,
Nace, Norwin, & Sellinger
("Paulson") to assume the role of
lead counsel. This necessitated
a new fee arrangement because
Paulson insisted on receiving
two-thirds of the contingency fee.
Post and Bregman decided that
sixty percent of the remaining
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one-third would go to Post,
leaving Bregman with forty
percent of one-third. The deal
was conditional on Bregman
contributing
that
same
percentage of work and expenses
to the case. On November 1,
1994, Post received $260,000
from the settlement of the Taylor
case.
Post then balked at
honoring the agreement. In order
to settle the issue, Post filed a
complaint for declaratory relief in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County. Post asked the court to
declare
the agreement with
Bregman unenforceable because
He
it violated public policy.
believed the Maryland Lawyers'
Rules of Professional Conduct
(UMLRPC") should govern and
that Rule 1.5(e) would be violated
if the arrangement was upheld.
The Rule states that a division of
fee between lawyers from
different firms is acceptable only
if the division is proportional to
the work done by each lawyer.
Bregman filed a counterclaim,
contending that he had done aU
the work that was asked of him
and was entitled to the share

previously agreed upon.
The trial court, treating the
case as a breach of contract
action, granted Bregman's motion
for summary judgment and
determined that there was no
longer a need to issue declaratory
judgment. Accordingly, the court
ordered Post to pay the amount
owed to Bregman plus interest.
The Court of SpeCial Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the trial court's
decision,
holding that the
agreement was clear and that
courts should refrain from
applying MLRPC, which are rules
passed by the judiciary not the
legislature, in contract disputes.
Before turning its attention to
the claim that MLRPC should
govern the fee arrangement, the
court of appeals considered the
trial court's decision to dismiss
the action for declaratory
judgement. Post, 349 Md. at 159,
707 A.2d at 814. While it is
permissible for a court to dismiss
an
action
for
declaratory
judgment if the issue raised
becomes moot, the court of
appeals did not believe that such
was the case here. Id. Rather
than dealing with the several
issues which the parties sought to
clarify, the trial court rendered a
judgment on the breach of
contract claim in order to resolve
the dispute. Id. Thus, the trial
court never reached the MLRPC
issue. The court of appeals
determined that the dispute in this
case was far from the ordinary
breach of contract and the parties
were entitled to u a specific written
declaration" of their rights. Id. at
106,707 A.2d at 815.
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The court of appeals next
turned to the issue surrounding
the application of MLRPC, in
particular, Rule 1.5(e). Id. at 161,
707 A.2d at 815, The court found
the effect of the Rule had been
viewed by the lower courts' in two
different ways, as a condition
incorporated into the contract or,
like any law, as a supervening
check on the contract. Id. at 162,
707 A.2d at 815. The court
believed that this contradiction
arose from the larger issue of the
cognizance and enforceability of
MLRPC as a "statement of public
policy, equivalent in effect to a
statute." Id.
The court looked at the effect
of
professional
the
code
responsibility had in other states,
as well as in Maryland. Id. at 162,
707 A.2d at 815-16. Unlike other
states, the court found that the
Maryland rules were not "selfimposed internal regulations" but
were adopted by the court in
order to thoroughly regulate the
practice of law. Id. at 162-63, 707
A.2d at 816. The court held that
such a detailed regulation of any
occupation, "the integrity of which
is vital to nearly every other
institution and endeavor of our
society, constitutes an expression
of public policy having the force of
law." Id. at 163,707 A.2d at 816.
Only the court of appeals had
been granted the authority to
establish MLRPC, not the
legislature, and therefore the
code operates with the same
legal force as a statute. Id. at
163-64,707 A.2d at 816.
Turning from the general
operation of MLRPC, the court
stated that the real issue in the
instant case was whether
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MLRPC, specifically Rule 1.5(e),
was enforceable outside the
context
of the
traditional
disciplinary proceeding. Id. at
164,707 A.2d at 817. The court
found that courts in Maryland and
elsewhere have applied specific
rules outside the disciplinary
context. Id. Furthermore, Rule
1.5 itself had been applied in
cases outside Maryland to
determine the validity of feesharing agreements. Id. at 166,
707 A.2d at 817 (citing Baer v.
First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72
F.3d 1294 (7th Cir. 1995)). The
court agreed that Rule 1.5(e)
establishes public policy with
regard to the splitting of fees
among attorneys and that its
application should not be limited
to the disciplinary context. Id. at
168, 707 A.2d at 818. Although
the rule was not a per se defense,
the court held that it could be
used to render agreements which
are "in clear and flagrant
violation"
of
the
rule
unenforceable. Id.
Finally, the court annunciated
a number of factors to be
considered by a trial court when
confronted with a defense arising
from Rule 1.5(e). Id. at 169-70,
707 A.2d at 819. Some of the
factors a trial court must analyze
to determine the significance of a
violation include any harm done
to the client, the good faith of the
lawyers involved, and the public's
interest in enforcement. Id. Like
any equitable defense, the court
held the "principles of equity"
should be applied when raising a
Rule 1.5(e) violation. Id.
Judge Chasnow rejected the
majority opinion's application of

Rule 1.5(e) to the instant case.
Id. at 173, 707 A.2d at 821
(Chasnow, J. dissenting). Even if
such an ethical defense could be
raised in other cases, Chasnow
disagreed with its application to
the present facts for the simple
reason that Post, "not only
entered into [the contract], but ...
made the proposal himself." Id. at
174, 707 A.2d at 822. Further,
Bregman should not have to
prove that he did the requisite
proportion of work as a condition
precedent to receiving the money.
Id. at 178-79, 707 A.2d 823-24.
To determine validity, the contract
must be reasonable when it was
initiated, not after the case was
complete. Id. at 180, 707 A.2d at
825.
Accordingly, unless the
contract was clearly improper or
unethical when it was entered
into, the terms should be
enforced
regardless
of
subsequent events. Id. at 181,
707 A.2d at 825.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland's ruling in Post v.
Bregman
gives tremendous
significance to the Maryland
Lawyers' Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Circumstances to
which they apply are no longer
strictly limited to disciplinary
proceedings. More speCifically,
the court's holding that Rule
1.5(e) can be raised as an
equitable defense to contracts
entered into between lawyers
regarding the division of fees is
likely to have a great impact on
the legal community. Attorneys
will now have to take great pains
to further account for the amount
of work done when such an
agreement is established.

